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in selecting the optimal strategy as soon as new information be-
comes available (Kester 1984; Mun 2002).
In a strict sense, the real-options method is the extension of the
financial options theory to options on real assets. Financial options
models use the close relationship between the underlying asset and
the derivative asset (the option) to replicate the results of a riskless
asset. The possibility of establishing a replicating portfolio permits
the calculation of the value of any contingent financial claim, simply
through observation of the capital markets. This evaluation method-
ologymakes it possible to use the known price of an asset to estimate
the relevant price of other assets whose value depends on the former.
The development of the financial derivatives theory has allowed
the existence of numerous models for the valuation of different fi-
nancial options, starting from the first works carried out by Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). Real options use these
models, by analogy, to value the different contingent claims that
are implicit in investment projects.
In the case of motorway concessions, real options arise in a
natural way from the interpretation of the clauses established in
the actual contracts. After all, the real-options approach contributes
a valuation tool, but the terms of the options are embedded in the
contracts that regulate rights and obligations for both contracting
parties. Some of the existing or possible real options in motorway
concessions are as follows (Lara Galera 2006):
• Minimum traffic guarantees (traffic floors) or maximum traffic
limitations (traffic caps).
• Public subsidies when traffic is lower than expected.
• Investment in new motorway stretches.
• Early abandonment of the concession.
• Anticipated reversion of the concession.
• Public participation loans.
• Extension of the concession period.
These mechanisms reduce cash-flow volatility, add flexibility to
the project, and allow a better management of the concession based
on the occurrence of future events. Some of these mechanisms have
been used one way or another in toll-motorway programs in differ-
ent countries. In this paper, the case of the early abandonment of a
project is studied.
Introduction
In the field of transportation infrastructure, investment projects have 
some specific features that are different from other types of invest-
ment. In general, infrastructure transportation projects have a high 
degree of uncertainty, require an important amount of resources, and 
are, to a large extent, irreversible. These features are clear in motor-
way concessions, where there is a wide potential for the application 
of the real-options approach. The latter is particularly appropriate in 
the context of strategic decision-making process and in the evalu-
ation of investment opportunities under conditions of uncertainty. 
The use of traditional methods of investment appraisal, based on 
discounted cash flow, is inappropriate in valuing projects that in-
volve managerial flexibility. When the discounted cash-flow method 
is used to value a project, the real options attached in it are implicitly 
ignored. It means that discounted cash-flow methods do not reflect 
the value of management (Brealey et al. 2010).
The traditional discounted cash-flow approach assumes a 
single-decision pathway with fixed incomes and outcomes, and 
all decisions are made at the beginning of the project, or in the 
tender process, without the possibility to change and develop them 
over time. The real-options approach takes into account a wide 
variety of decision pathways as a consequence of the high uncer-
tainty involved in projects, coupled with management’s flexibility
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The growing experience in public–private partnerships (PPPs)
for the provision of public infrastructure shows that, in a significant
number of cases, the private partner reaches a situation where it is
unable to meet its financial obligations.
There are examples of major contracts where the project could
not be completed due to an inadequate cost control, which was the
case of the Metronet PPP. This project was launched in 2002 for the
modernization of the London Underground. This project was sus-
pended, which caused the early termination of the contract and was
returned to public management (National Audit Office 2009).
Nevertheless, the main source of uncertainty in the majority of
infrastructure projects is the level of demand, especially in toll-road
concessions (Chen and Subprasom 2007). Therefore, most PPPs
insolvency situations possibly occur when the private partner’s rev-
enues depend on the demand, and it turns out to be much lower than
initially expected. Some important examples include the highway
program in Mexico between 1989 and 1994 (Carpintero and
Go´mez-Iban˜ez 2011) and, more recently, motorway concessions
in Spain (Baeza and Vassallo 2010).
Under a concession contract, the legal ownership of the conces-
sion-related assets and the responsibility of the service correspond
at all times to the public administration or the public granting au-
thority. Therefore, throughout the bidding process, the public
administration shall make sure that the concessionaire provides
guarantee for both technical and financial success to meet the con-
tract properly. Nevertheless, when a concession contract is termi-
nated due to a situation of insolvency, the issue of compensation to
the concessionaire arises. Apparently, in the case of a breach of
contract by the private partner, the existence of a compensation
would be questionable; in fact, an indemnity to the public
administration should be considered. However, when a certain asset
built by the private partner (e.g., a road) returns to the public sector
due to the early termination of the contract, the absence of com-
pensation to the private partner would cause an unfair benefit
for the public administration (HM Treasury 2007).
The asset transferred to the public sector will have a certain
value, which must be paid as a compensation to the private partner
after subtracting the indemnity to the public administration that
may correspond to the breach of its obligations. The question,
therefore, is to establish the criteria for determining such compen-
sation. In general, those criteria vary across countries. In many
cases, there is no specific legislation to determine the compensation
value; instead, the concession contract itself determines the value
or, in some cases, the criteria to calculate it (HM Treasury
2007).
It should be taken into account that the possible compensation to
the private partner in default cases is a key element considered by
the financial institutions funding the projects. However, the valu-
ation of the compensation at the time of signing the concession
contract is a complex problem. This is due to the fact that it is
a contingent compensation that only takes place in certain circum-
stances, this is, when a turn of events occurs leading the project to
insolvency.
Therefore, a distinction has to be made between the determina-
tion of the compensation in case of contract termination (the value
of which will be determined by law or by the concession contract
itself) and the valuation of such compensation (treated as a contin-
gent asset) at the time of signing the concession contract.
The valuation of the compensation as a contingent asset can be
performed when a significant variable can be identified whose evo-
lution over time can be adequately monitored. A methodology is
presented in this paper based on the theory of real options to assess
the valuation of this type of compensation. The overall idea is that
the mechanism of compensation in case of default can be modeled
as an abandonment option provided by the public administration to
the concessionaire. In such a model, the concessionaire will decide
whether or not to terminate the contract based on the evolution of
the concession outcome.
At the time when the valuation of the option is made, future re-
sults of the concession are contingent. In this study, it is assumed that
such results will depend fundamentally on the traffic evolution on the
motorway. Therefore, the traffic becomes the underlying asset of the
motorway concession. According to the stochastic process followed
by traffic volume, and based on the value of certain parameters, it is
possible to determine the value of the abandonment option.
A similar approach is followed by Zhao et al. (2004) for a theo-
retical analysis of the decision-making process in highway develop-
ment. Chiara et al. (2007) assessed the value of a revenue guarantee
granted by the government in a concession project. The methodol-
ogy of real options has the advantage of considering a neutral envi-
ronment regarding risk. This rules out the issue of determining
an appropriate discount rate for the future cash flows of the project,
an issue that would be practically unsolvable due to the existence
of the option itself.
In this work, this methodology will be applied to the case of
toll-motorway concessions in Spain. In this country, the compensa-
tion for the concessionaire is regulated by law, and is based on the
investment made by the concessionaire, taking into account the am-
ortization of such investment. Nevertheless, the methodology would
be analogous for any other criteria employed to establish the com-
pensation, although the results would logically be different in each
case. In the following section, the abandonment option is character-
ized, as well as the methodology used for the valuation of the com-
pensation. Then, such methodology is applied to the abandonment
option arising in a real case of a motorway concession in Spain.
Finally, the main conclusions of the paper are summarized.
Abandonment Option in Motorway Concessions
The classical perspective of the investment theory presents projects
as irreversible until the end of their life; only at that moment the
reallocation of the employed resources occurs. However, the reality
shows a very different scenario. A study on the diversification of 33
large U.S. companies during the period 1950–1986 (Porter 1987)
shows that most of them abandoned many more projects than
they kept.
The projects incorporating some flexibility regarding the uncer-
tain development of future events logically involve a greater value
versus those who do not have this flexibility. The possibility of
abandoning or liquidating a project at a given time for a higher
value than expected if it continued to be operated provides this kind
of flexibility and can be considered an implicit real option in the
project. This option is valuable to their holders, because it enables
them to recover a certain part of the investment in unfavorable
situations.
The option of abandoning a project is formally equivalent to
an American put option with an exercise price equal to the value
of abandonment of the project. However, it is not a simple put
option because the project provides some uncertain cash flows
and has a value of abandonment or settlement, which may be un-
certain too.
The first authors to recognize the value of abandonment in the
analysis of investment projects were Robichek and Van Horne
(1967). They stated that projects with significant abandonment
values must incorporate the abandonment option in the capital
budgeting process for optimal capital allocation within the firm.
Aware of its importance, they proposed a method for analyzing
the abandonment option. They considered that a project should
be abandoned at the time when the abandonment value exceeds the
present value of future cash flows.
One of the first authors to study the abandonment decision from
the perspective of real options was Margrabe (1978). Subsequently,
Myers and Majd (1990) devised a model based on a put option with
an uncertain exercise price. The total value of a project would be
given by its own cash flows plus the value of the abandonment op-
tion.When the present value of the project falls below its liquidation
value, the act of abandoning or selling the project is equivalent to
exercising the put option with a strike price equal to the liquidation
value of the project which sets a lower limit value thereof. Therefore,
a project that may be settled in this way is worth more, or equal, to a
similar project without the possibility of abandonment.
In motorway concessions, real options arise out of the interpre-
tation of the clauses of the concession contracts themselves, which
regulate the rights and obligations of the concessionaire. Alterna-
tively, such options may stem from the legislative framework that
applies to such contracts.
From the perspective of the theory of options, the compensation
for the concessionaire in case of default would be equivalent to the
exercise price of an abandonment option implicit in the concession
contracts. However, note that in other kind of projects it can be
assumed that the abandonment can occur at any time. This is
not possible in motorway concession contracts, due to the nature
of public interest of the transportation infrastructure.
In other words, the exercise of the abandonment option (and the
corresponding payment of the exercise price) will not be automatic,
but will generally be preceded by negotiations between the
administration, the concessionaire and, where appropriate, the
financial institutions. In this case, the abandonment option (for pur-
poses of modeling) could be envisaged, in theory, as a put option
that could be exercised in a limited number of dates; for example,
annually within the operating period. The optimal time to exercise
the option would be an additional outcome of the modeling process
itself.
Under this approach, there are different procedures to determine
the value of the abandonment option. The one chosen for this work
is the Monte Carlo simulation method for its simplicity, intuitive-
ness, and flexibility to incorporate different sources of uncertainty.
The use of a simulation method to determine the value of real
options in transportation networks can be found, for example, in
Chow and Regan (2011).
Assume a motorway concession with an expected duration of
N years, in which the free cash flow generated in a given period
t depends on the traffic volume θt in that period, that is,
FCFt ¼ fðθtÞ, where FCFt is the free cash flow of the project in
period t.
It should be made clear that this free cash flow refers to the con-
cession project as such, regardless of the flow of finance between
the concessionaire and the funding institutions. Therefore, the value
of the abandonment option that is calculated represents the value of
such option regarding the project as a whole, not only for the con-
cessionaire.
Based on earlier studies of traffic in motorways (Sánchez Solin˜o
and Lara Galera 2012; Cabero Colín et al. 2013) it has been con-
sidered here that the traffic evolves over time following a geometric
Brownian motion with parameters α and σ, where α is the process
drift and σ its volatility. Therefore
dθt
θt
¼ αdtþ σdz ð1Þ
By analogy with financial assets, an expected rate of return μ
can be defined from the asset traffic that must comply, according to
the capital asset pricing model (Sharpe 1964)
μ ¼ rþ β½rm − r ð2Þ
where r = risk-free rate of return; rm = market rate of return; and
β = sensitivity factor that measures the variation of the return on
assets in relation to the variation of market performance (Lara
Galera 2006).
However, it is also known that, for any asset, the potential
sources of returns come from capital gains and dividends (Dixit
and Pindyck 1994)
μ ¼ αþ δ ð3Þ
where μ = return of the asset; α = growth rate of the value of the
asset; and δ = dividend generated by such asset.
Equating the two expressions above, it is possible to define the
following risk-adjusted traffic growth rate:
αadjusted ¼ r − δ ¼ α − β½rm − r ð4Þ
Therefore, there is another stochastic process θadjustedt , associated
with θt, such that (Hull 2006)
dθadjustedt
θadjustedt
¼ ðr − δÞdtþ σdz ð5Þ
where θadjusted0 ¼ θ0; θadjustedt = traffic volume, risk adjusted; and
r − δ = new traffic growth rate, risk adjusted.
Starting from this adjusted process, the value of any derivative
whose volatility is induced by the underlying variable (traffic) can
be determined. This procedure allows to treat the traffic as if it were
a financial variable, and then the options-valuation methodology is
applied.
The β coefficient can be related to the price of traffic risk (λ),
analogously to a financial asset, through the expression (Dixit and
Pindyck 1994)
λ ¼ μ − r
σ
¼ αþ δ − r
σ
ð6Þ
The λ parameter of risk must be equal for the traffic and for the
project (i.e., for the cash flows obtained by the concessionaire),
because the former is the source of uncertainty in the project.
Therefore, the following expression is satisfied:
μ − r
σ
¼ μproject − r
σproject
ð7Þ
where μproject and σproject = return and volatility of the project, re-
spectively. Replacing and operating in Eqs. (4), (6), and (7), the
following is obtained:
β
σ
¼ βproject
σproject
⇒ β ¼ σ
σproject
βproject ð8Þ
For the estimation of β, Lara Galera and Sánchez Solin˜o (2010)
use as a proxy the parameters obtained for the series of the return of
the shares of quoted highway concessionaire firms in the Spanish
stock market. The values obtained were σproject ¼ 0.22 and
βproject ¼ 0.45. Regarding traffic volatility (defined as the quasi-
standard deviation of the traffic growth rate), it was calculated that
in Spain the annual volatility of traffic in toll motorways tends to
average at 7.5% (Lara Galera 2006). Considering these values in
Eq. (8), a characteristic value of β equal to 0.15 is obtained.where dz = Wiener process. 
The stochastic differential Eq. (5) has a solution of the type
θadjustedt ¼ θadjusted0 e½ðr−δ−1=2σ
2Þtþσξ ﬃtp  ð9Þ
where ξ = random normal variable N (0,1).
The value of the project VT in any year T is given by
VT ¼
XN
i¼T
FCFiðθadjustedi Þe−rði−TÞ ð10Þ
It is assumed that the condition for abandoning the project in
year T (T < N), with a value of abandonment AT , is that the project
is no longer feasible. It can be understood that, for the purpose of
modeling, such situation of unfeasibility will be fulfilled when the
project value is lower than the outstanding debt of the project,
applying the definition of bankruptcy. This criterion can be found
in the Spanish legislation on concession contracts (Ministerio de
Fomento 2003). Besides, in U.K., the contractor default is consid-
ered as the trigger for the early termination of the contract (HM
Treasury 2007).
Therefore, the abandonment shall only take place if VT is
smaller than DT , the latter being the value of the outstanding debt
of the project in the year T. If the abandonment option is exercised,
the concession will perceive the abandonment value AT , giving up
the residual value of the project, VT . The value of the abandonment
option on the exercise date will then be given by
PT ¼

0 if VT ≥ DT
AT − VT if VT < DT ð11Þ
and at any given instant t by
Pt ¼ e−rðT−tÞEðPTÞ ð12Þ
where E = expected value operator.
Following the approach outlined above, the decision rule
adopted in this paper to determine the exercise of the abandonment
option differs from the traditional rule. According to the latter, the
abandonment option will be exercised when the value of the project
(VT) at a given time T is less than the value of abandonment (AT).
However, in practice, the abandonment option in concession con-
tracts is only exercised under an insolvency situation leading to the
termination of the contract. As has been seen, it was considered that
this insolvency occurs when the project value is lower than the out-
standing debt. It is normally assumed that the outstanding debt of
the project is lower than the abandonment value. Therefore, if
VT < DT , then AT − VT will always be greater than zero. Other-
wise, if the outstanding debt is greater than the abandonment value,
then the traditional rule to exercise the option would prevail.
Given that the abandonment option may be exercised at different
times, the value of Pt can be determined using a Monte Carlo sim-
ulation, under the following scheme:
• A trajectory of random values is generated following the outline
given by Eq. (9) to determine the traffic θadjustedt for each of the
years of the concession.
• In each generated trajectory, the first moment T is observed in
which the abandonment option would be exercised. From that
moment T, the trajectory would be truncated or, alternatively, it
would lead to the result that for such traffic trajectory, the option
would not be exercised throughout the concession period, ac-
cording to the criteria defined above, and the value of AT −
VT would be calculated.
• The previous two steps are repeated for a significant number of
times, counting for each T the number of trajectories where the
abandonment option is exercised on that date. In this way, the
expected value of the abandonment option for each T can be
calculated.
• The risk-free rate r would be used to obtain the total present
value of the option at the desired time t.
• In addition, it is possible to obtain the value of the likelihood
that the abandonment option is exercised at each time during the
concession period, as well as the probability that the option is
exercised at any time during the life of the concession. To do
this, it is necessary to consider that the exercise of the option
in a given year is conditional upon not exercising it in any
of the previous years.
The procedure described above can be completed by introduc-
ing a second source of uncertainty in the modeling, applicable to
greenfield motorway concessions. In these kind of projects, in ad-
dition to the uncertainty about future traffic evolution, there is also a
high uncertainty about the initial traffic. The Monte Carlo simula-
tion procedure described above enables the generation of different
traffic trajectories considering the initial traffic as a random vari-
able. This paper considers a normal distribution of the variable con-
sisting of the ratio between the real traffic and the traffic expected
by the concessionaire. In addition, it is assumed that future traffic
growth is independent of the initial traffic, which is consistent with
the traffic behavior as a variable that follows a geometric Brownian
motion.
There are several studies that show the empirical evidence avail-
able concerning the distribution of the variable θ0real=θ0expected,
including those of Flyvbjerg et al. (2005) and Næss et al. (2006).
The latter gives a high dispersion of initial real traffic in relation
to the expected initial traffic, though it referred to a sample that
includes both toll and toll-free motorways. More recently, Bain
(2009) provided the results for a large sample of more than 100
projects in various countries, on toll motorways. According to
the evidence provided by this study, the relationship between
the initial traffic and the expected traffic on toll motorways follows
a normal distribution, with an average equal to 0.81 and a standard
deviation equal to 0.24, for countries with a certain tradition in the
construction of toll roads. This distribution has been adopted in this
work. This would mean that there is a bias in the estimates of initial
traffic by concessionaires, who tend to overestimate such traffic
to some extent. Furthermore, the dispersion of the distribution
of the variable, given by the standard deviation, is high, which
shows the difficulty in estimating traffic. Note that, according to
the work cited above, the optimistic bias in traffic predictions is
considerably higher in countries with little experience in toll-
motorways concessions.
Application to a Motorway Concession in Spain
To illustrate the real-options methodology developed in this paper,
the aforementioned procedure will be applied to the case of a green-
field toll-motorway concession in Spain.
A major toll-motorway program was launched in Spain in the
late 1990s (Baeza and Vassallo 2010). This program was subject to
the general legislation on public infrastructure concessions which
established in a specific way how to determine the compensation to
the concessionaire upon termination of the concession contract
(Ministerio de Fomento 2003). In cases when the concessionaire
defaulted, the compensation for the return to the public sector of
the asset subject to the concession equals the value of the invest-
ment made, minus the corresponding depreciation, minus the in-
demnity to the public administration for the breach of contract.
This latter indemnity (which therefore decreases the value of the
compensation to the concessionaire) should be at least equal to
the guarantee lodged by the concessionaire at the time of the award-
ing of the contract. The value of this guarantee varies with each
contract; a typical value would be 5% of the investment considered
in the contract. This value of 5% is the minimum guarantee estab-
lished in the Spanish legislation on public procurement (Jefatura
del Estado 2007).
These rules about the termination of concession contracts in
the case of the default of the concessionaire represent an impor-
tant support for the financing of projects. Therefore, they contrib-
ute in a decisive way to the attraction of private capital for
investment in infrastructure. However, they also represent an
implicit cost to the administration, whose scope is determined
in this section.
Within the Spanish toll concession program mentioned above,
the case of the Airport Axis (M-12) project carried out in Madrid is
chosen. This motorway established a new access to terminal T4 of
Madrid airport, and it was constructed under a concession
agreement.
The construction phase of the project began in 2002 with a con-
cession period of 25 years and an investment of 327.8 million
Euros. The traffic expected by the concessionaire at the beginning
of the period of operation exceeded an annual average daily traffic
of 55,000 vehicles. The financing structure was 25% of equity and
75% of debt. Nevertheless, the simulation was made using different
levels of debt, to obtain the sensitivity of the option value to this
parameter.
The input data used in the valuation were the following:
• Annual growth rate of expected traffic α ¼ 3.5%.
• Annual risk-free rate of return r ¼ 4.63%. The risk-free return is
calculated taking as a reference the average interest rates over
the past 10 years in the secondary market for 15-year state bonds
in Spain.
• Annual market rate of return rm ¼ 10.45%. The characteristic
market return was established by averaging the performance
of the stock index IBEX-35 over the last 15 years.
• β ¼ 0.15.
• αadjusted ¼ 2.63%. This value is obtained from αadjusted ¼ α − β
½rm − r ¼ 3.5% − 0.15½10.45 − 4.63% ¼ 2.63%.
• δ ¼ 2.0%. This value is obtained from αadjusted ¼ r − δ→ δ ¼
r − αadjusted ¼ 4.63 − 2.63% ¼ 2%.
• Annual volatility of traffic σ ¼ 7.5%. This value is the one that
was used in this paper as the base case.
In addition, the relationship between the actual initial traffic and
the expected initial traffic is characterized, as pointed out in the
previous section, as a random variable with distribution N (0.81,
0.24), following Bain (2009).
As already mentioned, the existence of the compensation will be
modeled as a put option that can be exercised by the concessionaire
at certain times. Its possible exercise once every year is considered
during the operating period of the concession. In addition, it is also
assumed that in practice the option is not exercised during the
ramp-up period (that will be set at 3 years), so that all the agents
involved in the concession will observe traffic evolution during that
period before making a decision.
To set the compensation, in the base case, a value of the indem-
nity paid to the public administration for the breach equal to 5% of
the initial investment, as mentioned above, was considered. How-
ever, the sensitivity of the model to different values of the indem-
nity was also analyzed. An abandonment option exercised during
the operating period is considered for this purpose. Therefore, the
case of abandonment of the concession during the construction
period is excluded, which would possibly entail a much higher in-
demnity to the administration.
Taking into account these parameters, and applying the meth-
odology described in the “Abandonment Option in Motorway
Concessions” section, the main results obtained are summarized
in the following graphs.
As shown in Fig. 1, the value of the abandonment option in the
concession in the first exercise date is 19.76 million Euros in the
base case. The first exercise date was set by taking into consider-
ation a period of 2 years of construction and then a ramp-up period
of 3 years.
As expected, the value of the option decreases in successive
dates, as the operating period elapses without the option being ex-
ercised. The reason is that in the simulation process the option is
exercised, in a given year, if the trajectory of traffic (until this year)
Fig. 1. Value of the abandonment option (thousands of Euros) in each exercise date
is low. Therefore, only trajectories with a high traffic survive,
and the probability of exercising the option is lower in subsequent
years.
Fig. 1 shows, besides the base case, the results obtained for
larger values of traffic volatilities. The sensitivity of the value of
the option to the value of this parameter is high, increasing the value
of the option as volatility increases.
Additionally, the probabilities of exercising the option are rep-
resented in Fig. 2.
As may be observed, in the base case, the probability of exer-
cising the abandonment option is 16% in the first exercise date, thus
decreasing the odds on successive dates. However, increasing traf-
fic volatility increases the likelihood of exercise in the early years.
From these results, the full value of the abandonment option can
be obtained by aggregating the results obtained from the different
exercise dates of the concession period. These added values, which
were calculated at the time of commencement of the concession
using the risk-free rate of discount, are given in Fig. 3.
For the base case, the sum of the option values obtained in each
year of operation, taken at the beginning of the concession contract
and properly discounted, shows a total value of 58.4 million Euros,
which represents 17.8% of the value of the initial investment.
Therefore, the total value of the abandonment option represents
an important aid from the public administration to the concession.
This aid is not quantified in the concession contract, and it is not
reflected in the government’s budget. However, it is clear that it
represents a burden for the public sector and, ultimately, on the
taxpayer.
Likewise, the probability of exercising the option at any time
during the period of operation can also be obtained by aggregating
the probabilities of exercising the option at each exercise date. The
results obtained are given in Fig. 4. As shown, the probability of
exercising the abandonment option in any of the dates of exercise is
61.01% in the base case, reaching very high values for higher traffic
volatilities.
In Fig. 5, the sensitivity of the total value of the abandonment
option to the value of the indemnity paid by the concessionaire to
the public administration is shown. As can be observed, the value of
the abandonment option decreases significantly when the indem-
nity is higher. However, the probability of exercising the option
Fig. 2. Probability of exercising the abandonment option each year
Fig. 3. Total value of the abandonment option at t ¼ 0 (thousands of Euros)
at any time during the concession period does not change, because
the criterion for exercising the option only considers the value of
the project and the outstanding debt.
In addition, different degrees of leverage of the concession were
considered. For this purpose, the annual traffic volatility was set at
7.5%, the indemnity paid to the public administration at 5%, and
the ratio of debt in relation to total resources of the concession was
changed. The aggregated results for the set of all exercise dates are
shown in Figs. 6 and 7.
From Figs. 6 and 7, it can be seen that the degree of leverage is a
key parameter to determine the value of the abandonment option
and, above all, the probability of exercise. It can be seen that
the latter increases considerably when the debt of the concession
rises. This high sensitivity of the probability of exercising the aban-
donment option is due to the fact that a high leverage increases the
number of random trajectories of traffic for which the value of the
concession falls below the level of outstanding debt.
In summary, the results show a significant value of the abandon-
ment option. For the base case analyzed in this paper, the value of
the option represents, at the moment of commencement of the con-
cession contract, 17.8% of the initial investment in the motorway.
This amount can be considered as a hidden aid to the concession by
the public administration. In this sense, the regulation of insolvency
situations in concessions appears to be overly favorable toward the
concessionaire in the Spanish legislation. The value of the abandon-
ment option depends on the regulation of the compensation mecha-
nism, and thus the results obtained for the Spanish case cannot be
extended to other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the methodology
used for the calculation is applicable to other cases. Even more
significant are the results obtained regarding the probability of
exercising the option of abandonment throughout the life of the
concession, which for the base case would be above 60%. In other
words, this result is equivalent to the probability of the concession
becoming unfeasible at some point during the concession period.
The parameters adopted to characterize the evolution of traffic vol-
ume by no means could be considered extreme. The annual traffic
volatility over the life of the concession used in the analysis was
7.5%, which is the average value observed in the Spanish toll roads.
Fig. 4. Probability of exercising the abandonment option sometime
during the operating period
Fig. 5. Total value of the abandonment option (thousands of Euros) at t ¼ 0, for different values of the indemnity paid to the public administration
Fig. 6. Total value of the abandonment option (thousands of Euros)
at t ¼ 0, for different degrees of leverage
Fig. 7. Probability of exercising the abandonment option at some point
during the operation, for different degrees of leverage
For larger volatilities, both the value of the abandonment option as
well as the probability of occurrence are significantly higher.
Regarding the debt structure, one way to reduce the risk of
a concession default would be to set a maximum leverage limit.
Taking into account the results obtained in this study, debt levels
above 50% of total resources excessively increase the probability of
exercising the option of abandonment.
Conclusion
In motorway concessions, the compensation mechanisms in cases
of the concessionaire defaulting can imply a relevant implicit con-
tribution of the public sector to the concession, as presented in
this paper. This contribution may be justified to prevent an unfair
benefit to the public administration in case of early termination
of the concession contract. However, the methodology to appraise
the value of this mechanism has not been properly addressed be-
fore, which implies a certain lack of transparency in concession
contracts.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a methodology
based on the abandonment option, which enables to assess the
value of the compensation mechanism at the time of establishing
the contract. Logically, the result of the valuation will depend on
the specific characteristics of each compensation mechanism,
which will be defined in the current legislation or in the concession
contract itself.
In this paper, an application to the case of Spanish motorways
was developed. In Spain, the treatment of insolvency situations
in infrastructure concessions is regulated by legislation. Under
Spanish law, the compensation to the concessionaire is determined
on the basis of the amount invested reduced by the depreciation of
the assets and by the corresponding indemnity to the admin-
istration. Based on this approach, the aforementioned methodology
was applied to real data from a specific motorway concession. The
characteristics of the chosen concession contract are analogous to
those of other toll-motorway concessions in Spain, meaning that
the results discussed in this paper could potentially be extended
to other cases in this country.
The results show that motorway concessions are a highly risky
business, due to the inherent characteristics of the underlying asset,
the traffic volume. Furthermore, the probability of exercising the
option of abandonment, as stated in the model developed in this
work, depends only on the residual value of the project and its out-
standing debt, factors that are independent from the value of the
compensation to the concessionaire, which determines the value
of the option, but not the probability of exercise.
The high risk of motorway concession projects should be taken
into account in the design of the financing structure of the business;
it seems clear that too high leverage ratios were adopted in the past.
This result can be generalized for other countries (unlike the results
obtained for the value of the abandonment option), because the lev-
erage ratio used in most PPP agreements are even higher than those
used in Spanish concessions.
In conclusion, the application of the real-options methodology
presented in this paper can contribute to gaining a better under-
standing of the risks of motorway concessions and promoting a
better design of concession contracts, leading to a more reasonable
probability of exercising the abandonment option.
Finally, although the model developed in this paper has been
specifically applied to motorway concessions, the methodology
can be extended to other fields. For example, it can be applied
to PPP agreements in public transit, railways, airports, or ports,
when the remuneration of the private partner (and therefore, the
cash flows of the project) depends on demand. However, the ex-
tension of the model is not automatic. In particular, the parameters
that characterize the diffusion process followed by the traffic should
be studied in each case.
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